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Abstract
In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument does not
apply when rms compete for myopic consumers who optimize period-by-period. I
develop the model in the context of aftermarket. With overlapping-generations of
consumers, simultaneous product o¤erings in the primary market and aftermarket es-
tablishes a price oor for the primary good. This constraint prevents aftermarket rents
from being dissipated by the primary market competition. Duopoly rms earn positive
prots despite price competition with undi¤erentiated products. Nonetheless, gov-
ernment interventions to reinforce aftermarket competition such as a standardization
requirement may lead to the partial collapse of the primary market. (JEL D40, L40)
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Over the lifetime of a printer, the average consumer spends more money on replacement
cartridges than on the printer itself.1 Yet many consumers ignore cartridge costs when buying
a printer. A survey conducted by the O¢ ce of Fair Trading (OFT) nds that 3 out of 4
individual printer buyers do not have any idea of cartridge costs.2 Business customers are
not much di¤erent: 61 percent of 200 UK nancial directors polled by printer manufacturer
Lexmark International (Lexmark) do not know and have no plan to reduce the printing costs
of their companies.3 Some agencies, such as the US Federal Government, have purchasing
systems that "do not lifecycle price, but rather choose the lowest price in each market".4
The printer/cartridge industry is just one example of many industries that involve two
markets: a primary market and an aftermarket.5 Consumers make initial purchases of
systems in the primary market and then buy additional supplies, services, and upgrades in
the aftermarket. Aftermarket goods or services are essential to the use of primary goods, but
are bought at a point in time after the purchase of primary goods. Because of the temporal
relationship between primary markets and aftermarkets, some consumers may make myopic
purchase decisions, focusing on the initial price but ignoring long run costs. The existence
of consumer myopia raises a number of interesting questions: How do prot-maximizing
rms respond to consumer myopia? Can they take advantage of myopic consumers? Is
competition in the primary market su¢ cient to protect myopic consumers?
This paper addresses these questions. I model myopic consumers as individuals who
optimize period-by-period. I nd that rms monopolize aftermarkets through the strategic
use of incompatibility. I show that in a dynamic model with overlapping-generations of con-
sumers, duopoly rms earn positive prots despite price competition with undi¤erentiated
1Estimates on cartridge expenses vary. According to the O¢ ce of Fair Trading, the average consumer
will spend between 2 and 17 times the purchase price of an inkjet printer on ink during an average three
year printer lifetime. "Consumer IT goods and services", 2002.
2"Consumer IT goods and services", the O¢ ce of Fair Trading, 2002.
3"Lexmark reveals UK companies are unaware of document production costs", Telecom World Wire,
January 22, 2004.
4Excerpt from the US Supreme Court Opinion on Eastman Kodak Company, Petitioner v. Image Tech-
nical Services, Inc., et at., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
5The aftermarket pattern is ubiquitous (Shapiro, 1995). It includes software/upgrades, durable
goods/consumables (e.g. equipement/supplies, appliances/parts, etc.) and all post-sale services.
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products. Moreover, neither rm has an incentive to compete by educating myopic con-
sumers. Consequently, aftermarket monopolization persists in a competitive industry and
causes substantial consumer injury. These results suggest that consumer myopia may play an
important role in rmsmarket conduct, and may therefore merit serious policy discussions.6
A belief widely held by economists is that as long as there is signicant competition in
the primary market, rms do not gain from consumer myopia because aftermarket rents are
dissipated by the competition. This view is best expressed by Carl Shapiro (1995) in his
criticism of the Supreme Court decision that permitted a jury trial to determine whether
Kodak was guilty of monopolization on an aftermarket theory:7
Sellers are surely aware of the life-cycle prots associated with selling a piece of
equipment, even if buyers are poorly informed about aftermarket costs. There-
fore, systems competition pushes manufacturers to discount their equipment to
capture any aftermarket monopolyprots, ... [thus] substantial ongoing con-
sumer injury from exclusionary aftermarket policies is unlikely to occur in com-
petitive equipment markets. ... Furthermore, manufacturers in a competitive
equipment market have incentives to avoid even this ine¢ ciency [i.e. consump-
tion distortion] by providing information to consumers (Parentheses added).
In his view, any attempts to monopolize aftermarkets are futile and competition in the
primary market is su¢ cient to protect even myopic consumers. Shapiros intuition has since
found support in a number of formal models. Although these models generate aftermarket
overpricing with various economic arguments, they share one common feature: all competi-
tive rms earn zero prot when the degree of product di¤erentiation approaches zero.8
6"The OFT has criticised printer manufacturers for using customer loyalty and trust to e¤ectively set
pricesin the post-sale market, after it found that 75 per cent of people it surveyed had no idea of printing
costs. ... Meanwhile the European Competition Commission has requested submissions on pricing policies
from the inkjet industry before it decides whether or not to investigate it for anti-competitive behaviour. If
found guilty, companies could be ned up to 10 per cent of their sales." (Financial Times, March 6, 2003)
7Eastman Kodak Company, Petitioner v. Image Technical Services, Inc., et at., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
8Severin Borenstein, Je¤rey K. MacKie-Mason and Janet S. Netz (1995, 2000) nd that competing rms
may set aftermarket prices above marginal cost, if commitment technologies are unavailable. They conclude
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In an important sense, however, Shapiro and other authors fail to recognize the inherent
connection and conict between primary market competition and aftermarket monopoliza-
tion. I use a simple example to illustrate this point.
Static v. Dynamic Consider two printer manufacturers, each of whom produces printers
at unit cost of cA and cartridges at unit cost of cB. They compete in prices à la Bertrand.
A consumer buys a printer system (including a cartridge) in period 1 and then buys another
cartridge from the original manufacturer in period 2. The consumer values each unit of
cartridge consumption at vB > cB.
The consumer is myopic in the sense that she only compares printer system prices. Hence
a rm sets the cartridge price pB = vB and earns a prot of vB cB. Anticipating this prot,
rms compete by cutting printer system prices, which become pAB = cA+ cB   (vB   cB) by
the standard argument (assuming no discounting). In the end, each rm earns zero prot
and the consumer obtains all surplus, even though she acts myopically and pays a monopoly
price for the cartridge. There is no welfare loss. This is the essence of Shapiros argument.
However, a careful inspection reveals that the printer system price is exactly equal to the
cartridge price less the total surplus (of 1 printer and 2 cartridges):
(1) pAB = pB   (
social surplus >0z }| {
2vB   2cB   cA) < pB
This means that in order for aftermarket rents to be dissipated by primary market competi-
tion, the printer system price has to be lower than the cartridge price.9 While this is possible
that aftermarket monopolization can cause signicant e¢ ciency loss. My model lends support to their
conclusion on welfare, but relies on a di¤erent mechanism and has a di¤erent policy implication. Zhiqi Chen
and Thomas W. Ross (1999) adopt a variation of the "metering" story (Ward S. Bowman, 1957) and argue
that aftermarket overpricing can help rms cover the costs associated with high intensity userswarranty
services. Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills (2001) nd that pricing both equipment and services
above costs is socially optimal because it allows manufacturers to recover xed R&D and production costs.
Dennis Carlton and Michael Waldman (2006) and Hodaka Morita and Waldman (2006) show that rms may
have an incentive to monopolize the maintenance market in order to avoid the ine¢ ciency associated with
maintaining a used unit. See Shapiro (1995) and Chen et al. (1998) for an excellent survey.
9The above constraint holds as long as the aftermarket product is essential and its demand is inelastic. The
reason is simple: monopoly pricing under inelastic demand yields zero consumer surplus in all future periods.
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in a static game with one generation of consumers, it cannot hold in a dynamic model with
overlapping-generations of consumers; otherwise, a cartridge buyer may instead buy a new
printer system. In other words, simultaneous product o¤ering in the primary market and
aftermarket establishes a price oor for the primary good ("no arbitrage"):
(2) pABt  pBt
Therefore, the standard Bertrand competition argument no longer applies.10
This example exhibits the limitation of the traditional view, and gives us the basic intu-
ition of why primary market competition may not dissipate aftermarket rents. When there
are both old and new customers, any price cut in the printer system to attract new customers
forces a rm to lower its cartridge price thus reducing the rms prot from old customers,
the cartridge buyers. Each rm faces a tradeo¤between gaining market share and harvesting
captive consumers. Because of this, rms soften competition and earn higher prots.
In my model, two printer manufacturers rst make compatibility choices then compete in
prices. Through incompatibility, a rm commits not to invade its rivals installed base and
this induces the rival to compete less aggressively for new customers (a strategy that I call
"feed-then-overtake"). In the equilibrium, rms gain market share in alternating periods and
earn positive prots from myopic consumers. Furthermore, rms use loss leader pricing to
prevent myopic consumers from pooling with consumers with perfect foresight, resulting in
a complete market segmentation, with both rms competing for myopic consumers and the
more e¢ cient rm alone serving foresighted consumers. Interestingly, the more e¢ cient rm
earns a higher prot from myopic consumers, even though it has an apparent competitor
In a dynamic model, Shapiros argument might hold only if demand is elastic, but then the consumption
distortion from aftermarket overpricing is more severe. This constraint can also be modied to accommodate
cases in which the aftermarket product is not essential. See Lemma 1 and its footnote in Section B.
Other authors (Borenstein et al. 1995; Fudenberg and Tirole 1998; Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi 2003)
have also noted the possibility of such constraints in similar contexts.
10The same result holds if rms cannot commit to future prices. However, while rms have incentives
to make commitments, they have no incentive to eliminate consumer myopia. Please see Section IV.A and
IV.B. for further discussions.
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in that market. Rather than advertise a low aftermarket price and capture all consumers,
the rm chooses to share the market and take advantage of myopic consumers. At the same
time, the less e¢ cient rm, unable to compete for foresighted consumers, targets myopic
consumers and obtains a small but positive market share.
There has been renewed interest in aftermarket pricing following Glenn Ellison (2005)
and Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson (2006). It may therefore be useful to compare my
results with those of the two. Under the assumption that higher willingness to pay consumers
also have stronger brand preferences, Ellison (2005) shows that rms can use add-on pricing
(advertising the primary good price only) to generate price discrimination over perfectly
rational consumers and soften competition.11 However, add-on pricing is not an equilibrium
outcome: while rms jointly benet from add-on pricing, an individual rm is better o¤ by
deviating. In my model, a rm may want to steal business from its competitor by educating
a myopic consumer and o¤ering a lower add-on price, but such an attempt is self-defeating
because it changes the consumers type and renders the deviation unprotable. Accordingly,
a collusive outcome (the no-education result) can be supported in the equilibrium.
More closely related to my study is a paper by Gabaix and Laibson (2006). In their model,
some consumers are naive: they make myopic purchase decisions in the printer market and
underestimate cartridge costs thereby consuming more than the optimal amount. (Note that
this is a stronger notion of consumer myopia than the one I use.) Firms use printers as a
loss leader and reap prots from selling expensive cartridges. Add-on pricing emerges as an
equilibrium outcome. However, due to the static nature of their model, Shapiros argument
applies and rms still earn zero prot.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I presents some empirical
evidence to motivate my model. Section II presents the main result: in a dynamic model
with overlapping-generations of myopic consumers, duopoly rms earn positive prots via
11It should be noted that add-on goods is a more general class than aftermarket goods, on which my
analysis focuses. It includes both aftermarket goods that are required for the use of primary goods and pure
add-on goods, such as extra services o¤ered by hotels or car rental companies, that are not required for the
use of primary goods.
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aftermarket monopolization despite price competition with undi¤erentiated products. Sev-
eral extensions are then considered. In Section III, I show the monopoly paradox: a primary
market monopolists prot decreases with the percentage of myopic consumers. Section IV
discusses implications of my paper and concludes. Any formal proofs omitted from the main
text are contained in the appendix.
I. Motivation and Evidence
Printer and Cartridge About 85 percent of the US printer sales are inkjet products.12 ;13
The inkjet printer market is remarkably concentrated, with Hewlett-Packard alone making
half of all sales and three other manufacturers, Lexmark, Epson, and Canon, supplying a
combined 40 percent. Each printer manufacturer supplies ink cartridges for its own range
of printers. There is very limited entry into the cartridge market by non-OEM suppliers,
accounting for just over 13 percent of the total sales in the US. This means that a printer
manufacturer is e¤ectively able to set prices in its own aftermarket. Each cartridge costs less
than $10 to make but is typically priced at $20 to $40.14 Consumer purchases (as opposed to
business purchases) account for around 60-70 percent by value. In practice, consumers spend
more money on replacement cartridges than on printers themselves.15 However, retailers
responding to the OFT survey said that some 75 percent of their customers did not have
any idea of printing costs and "rst time or inexperienced buyers tended to carry out the
least research".16
12"PC Printers - US - July 2004", Mintel, 2004.
13There are two main types of printers: laser printers and inkjet printers. Laser printers tend to be the
most suitable for black and white printing and inkjet printers are more versatile, particularly when it comes
to color printing.
14"Printing a Record of Growth", Business Week Online, 2/17/2004.
15According to the OFT report ("The Consumer PC Market in the US", The O¢ ce of Fair Trading, 2002.),
"the single largest proportion of retail information technology revenue in the US - $7.47 billion during 2001
- is generated from sales of printing consumables such as ink cartridges, laser toners and specialist printing
papers". The comparable gure for printers is only $2 billion.
16"Consumer IT Goods and Services", The O¢ ce of Fair Trading, 2002.
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To further examine the market structure and the pricing pattern, I collected data from
the web sites of the four printer manufacturers. Only inkjet printers available for purchase
in their online stores were included. In total, there were 78 models o¤ered, 40 by HP, 6 by
Lexmark, 14 by Epson and 18 by Canon. I recorded product information such as printer
model number and price, compatible cartridge model number and price, cartridge yield
(number of pages per cartridge) and number of cartridges included with the printer.17 I
calculate the per page cost for each cartridge by dividing its price by its yield.
An inkjet printer is typically equipped with a black ink cartridge and either a tricolor
cartridge or three single-color cartridges.18 Based on the type of cartridges they use, I
divide all printers into two groups.19 Descriptive statistics for the two groups are reported
in Appendix C. Table 3 compares the two groups. The per page costs of tricolor cartridges
are signicantly higher than those of single color cartridges (t = 19:499). Even the per page
costs of black ink cartridges of single-color inkjets are lower than those of tricolor inkjets
(t = 7:367). At the same time, the price of tricolor inkjet printers are signicantly lower than
single-color inkjets (t = 3:821). There appears to be a high degree of market segmentation.
Interestingly, the low-end market with higher cartridge prices appears more competitive
than the high-end market. From Table 1 and 2, we can see that in the Sub-$100 category,
all manufacturers o¤er about the same number of models, which is indicative of the "in-
tense" competition in that category, whereas in the above-$700 category only HP is active.
Moreover, from Table 2, we can see that Lexmark, the second largest printer manufacturer,
currently does not sell any single-color inkjets. All its printers fall in the sub-$100, tricolor
category. At the same time, the average printing cost of Lexmark printers is the highest
179 models o¤er two compatible black ink cartridges but I only include the cartridge that yields closer to
450 pages, the median (as well as the mode) yield of all printers.
18A tricolor cartridge is formed by combining cyan, magenta, and yellow (CMY).
19I only list the price and yield information for one of the three single-color cartridges because prices and
yields are identical for the other two colors.
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among all manufacturers.20 In spite of this, Lexmarks market share grew almost threefold
from 1997 to 2001, as shown in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
The leading explanation of aftermarket overpricing is price discrimination:21 a rm with
market power can use discriminatory pricing to extract more surplus from customers who
use printers more intensively. This mechanism relies on the existence of a su¢ cient degree
of product di¤erentiation in the printer market such that each rm has some market power.
Accordingly, more rms should be selling high-end products than selling low-end products,
which tend to be more homogeneous. However, we observe the opposite, as shown in Figure
2. Furthermore, in a model based on the price discrimination story, Eric R. Emch (2003)
nds, when primary market competition intensies, aftermarket markups disappear before
those in the primary market. This is contrary to the evidence presented above.
Insert Figure 2 here
Antivirus Software and Virus Denition Updates The worldwide antivirus software
market totaled $2.2 billion in 2002, where Norton Antivirus leads with 68.3% market share
and McAfee VirusScan has 25.5%. Use of antivirus software requires up-to-date virus def-
initions, which are provided by the software maker as an annual subscription service. The
marginal cost of providing such a service is close to zero,22 but rms typically charge consid-
erably higher. Whereas a retail version of the software program only includes one-year virus
denition updates, enterprise users can pay a higher upfront license fee in exchange for an
extended period of free updates. Since demand for virus updates is inelastic, the markup on
virus denition updates cannot be attributed to price discrimination.
20By some accounts, Lexmarks printer supplies make up just over half of its total revenue and an even
greater share of its total prot. ("Protecting the Family Jewels", Forbes, 12/8/2003; "Legal Battle Could
Determine Future Price of Printer Cartridges", USA Today, 1/29/2003.)
21Emch (2002) tests opportunism as an alternative explanation for aftermarket markups in laser printer
and computer memory but nds mixed evidence.
22The program automatically downloads the virus denition updates on a weekly basis from the server,
which is maintained by the software maker.
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The latest version of Norton Antivirus is sold at $49.95. It includes one-year of free virus
denition updates, which normally costs $19.95. An upgrade from a previous version costs
$29.95, but it does not include virus denition updates. McAfee VirusScan o¤ers an almost
identical package ($49.99/$19.95/$29.95). It is noteworthy that $49.95 is also the lowest that
a rm can charge for a new version, since no customer will buy an upgrade otherwise.
To summarize, there are both a widespread consumer bias in overlooking long-run costs
and the existence of signicant aftermarket markups. In the following, I develop a model to
explore their implications to the market structure and social welfare. It is worth emphasizing
that the purpose of this paper is to introduce one of the models that can potentially account
for the above empirical facts, but there may well be other models that can replicate the
evidence.
II. A Duopoly Model
A. The Basic Setup
In this section, I introduce the basic elements of my model, including consumerspreferences
and rmsproduction technology. For concreteness, I use printers (A) to refer to primary
goods and cartridges (B) to refer to aftermarket goods or services.23
In each of innitely many discrete periods, t = 0; 1; 2; :::;1, a unit mass of consumers
enters the market and leaves after two periods. In period 1, a consumer buys a printer system
worth vAB to her;24 in period 2, the consumer buys an additional qB units of cartridges to
maximize u(qB)   pBqB, where pB is the cartridge price and u() satises u(0) = 0; u0  0;
23AB represents a printer system that includes a printer and a cartridge.
24For tractability, here I implicitly assume that the demand (normalized to 1) for cartridges is inelastic in
period 1. Without further loss of generality, I assume that the demand is elastic in period 2, but the same
results hold under inelastic demand, a condition satised in the opening example.
While this change in elasticity creates asymmetry in the demand structure, it does allow me to capture the
observation that myopic consumers respond to cartridge prices only after they start to shop for replacements.
Borenstein et al. (2000) also assume inelastic demand in period 1 and elastic demand in period 2.
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u0(1) = 0 and u00 < 0.25 Thus at every period a cohort of printer buyers and a cohort of
printer owners (cartridge buyers) are in the market.
Since a printer system includes a cartridge, (with a little abuse of notation) I dene
u(qAB; qB) = u(qAB + qB); where qAB is the number of printer systems bought in period 2.
This specication implies that a printer system and a cartridge are perfect substitutes and
that a printer owner will buy a new printer system (of the same brand) if it is cheaper than
a cartridge.26 She, however, faces a prohibitively high cost of switching to a di¤erent brand
of printer.27
There are two printer manufacturers, who also sells cartridges. Each rm produces print-
ers at a constant marginal cost of cA and cartridges at a constant marginal cost of cB.
Two printer systems (interbrand or intrabrand) are compatible (respectively, incompatible)
if they use (respectively, do not use) the same cartridge. As in Nicholas Economides (1989),
I only consider full compatibility or full incompatibility. Along with the high switching cost,
system incompatibility helps a rm to lock in its customers.28 To make the prediction less
trivial, I allow for unilateral compatibility, i.e., one rm can achieve compatibility and com-
pete for customers by simply replicating the others cartridge design. Each rm maximizes
total prots with a discount factor of  < 1. I assume that rms cannot condition prices on
a consumers purchase history.29
25I ignore the integer constraint on the number of cartridges. Or, to put it another way, qB can be seen
as the number of pages printed and pB as the cost per page. This means that the capacity of a cartridge is
irrelevant in this model.
26If depreciation, loss of warranty or an increased chance of breakdown, etc., causes a consumer to value a
used printer less than a new one, then we can obtain the same results by redening u(qAB ; qB) = qABV A +
u(qAB + qB); where V A is the new printer premium. I normalize V A to 0 in order to cut down the number
of parameters of which we keep track.
27The switching cost can be due to brand loyalty, search cost, the cost of learning a new user interface or
the network e¤ects in an organization setting. My results will not change qualitatively if I introduce a small
but positive switching cost that allows equilibrium switching: rmsprots will then be proportional to the
switching cost, as in Farrell and Shapiro (1988) and A. Jorge Padilla (1995). Beggs and Klemperer (1992)
also assume that the switching cost in their model is so high as never to bind.
28It is important to note that switching costs associated with system incompatibility are di¤erent from
the cost of switching brands. Two systems of di¤erent brands can be compatible yet involve high switching
costs because they have di¤erent user interfaces. Conversely, two systems of the same brand may share the
user interface but use di¤erent cartridges.
29This assumption is supported by the OFT report: "[printer] suppliers were unlikely to be able to dis-
criminate between rst time and second time buyers in retail outlets". However, this assumption does rule
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Denote by i the index of available printer/cartridge systems, pABi;t the price of a printer
system and pBi;t the price of a cartridge.
30 ;31 A fully rational consumer (henceforth "foresighted
consumer") maximizes discounted sum of utilities when selecting a printer system, that is,
she solves maxif(vAB pi; tAB)+maxAq B; qB[u(qAB+qB) qABpi; t+1AB qBpi; t+1B]g:
However, some consumers are myopic. They have limited foresight and choose to optimize
period-by-period: in period 1, they select the lowest-priced printer system; in period 2, they
optimize over cartridge consumption.32 Formally, a myopic consumer solvesmaxi(vAB pABi;t )
at time t (suppose that the solution is i); then solves maxqAB ;qB [u(qAB + qB)  qABpABi;t+1  
qBpBi;t+1] at time t+1. In the remainder of the paper, for notational simplicity, the subscripts
i and t are suppressed when it is unambiguous.
Since myopic consumers also optimize their cartridge consumption, the two types of
consumers have the same demand for cartridges. For a cartridge or a (lower-priced) printer
system priced at pB, let D(pB) = argmaxqB [u(qB)   pBqB] be a consumers second-period
cartridge demand, V (pB) = u[D(pB)]   pBD(pB) be the corresponding consumer surplus,
and (pB) = (pB   cB)D(pB) be a rms undiscounted second-period cartridge prot per
customer, I assume that (pB) is single-peaked and denote by pm = argmaxpB (pB) the
monopoly price of a cartridge. The following results are standard:
R1. (downward-sloping demand) D0 < 0: This follows from the assumption that u00 < 0:
R2. (deadweight loss) V (cB) > V (pB) + (pB); 8pB 6= cB. The strict inequality follows
from R1.
R3. (individual rationality) V (pB)  0; 8pB; the equality holds if and only if D(pB) = 0:
out the applicability of my analysis to non-anonymous subscription services for which new and old customers
pay di¤erent rates. Two notable examples are cable and telephone services.
30If rms sell printers and cartridges as separate products, then pAB should be replaced by pA+pB , where
pA is the price of a standalone printer. I use the notation pAB instead of pA because there is no demand for
a standalone printer in the model.
31If multiple compatible cartridges are available for printer i at time t; then pBi;t should be understood as
the lowest price among such cartridges.
32It should be noted that my assumption of consumer myopia is weaker than the one used by Gabaix and
Laibson (2006), where consumers optimize aftermarket consumption only as a result of education. In fact, in
the (pooling) equilibrium they derive, an educated consumer behaves no di¤erently from a myopic consumer
in my model.
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Finally, I make the following assumptions on the range of parameter values:
Assumption 1 (Positive Monopoly Prot) (pm cA cB)+(pm) > 0. This assump-
tion is not restrictive. It states that if a rm sells a printer system at the monopoly price of
a cartridge and earns a monopoly prot in cartridges, then the total prots are positive.
Assumption 2 (No Ine¢ cient Replacement) vAB  pm: This assumption says that a
myopic consumers reservation price of a printer system is higher than the monopoly price of
a cartridge. It guarantees that the consumer will not choose to replace an old printer system
with a new one when the latter and cartridges are sold at their respective monopoly prices.
B. The Game
Firms are long-lived and their competition takes place on an innite horizon. I look for
symmetric stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), in which a rms strategy depends
only on the rms current (printer) market share and not otherwise on history. I assume
that all consumers buy from the same rm if rms charge the same price for their printer
systems.33 Since printer systems are ex ante homogeneous,34 only one rm makes positive
sales each period. Hence, the state variable (market share) is a binary variable. As in Farrell
and Shapiro (1988), I call a rm that has sold printer systems in the most recent period the
"incumbent" (I) and its rival the "entrant" (E). Note that incumbency is not xed, but is
determined by market share evolution. Thus, in each period, there are two printer systems
and two cartridges available, denoted by (pABI ; p
B
I ) and (p
AB
E ; p
B
E):
33This assumption allows me to dene the state variable as a binary one. The same assumption is used by
Farrell and Shapiro (1988) and Padilla (1995). It guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in a game with
discontinuous payo¤s (Dasgupta and Maskin 1986). My result also holds if rms charging the same price
have equal chances of selling to all consumers (i.e., winner-take-all in Baye and Morgan 2002). However,
whether an equilibrium exists if rms split sales remains an open question.
34Although the assumption of ex ante homogeneous products has an undesirable consequence, namely,
in each period one rm makes all printer sales, it allows me to eschew the problem that assuming product
di¤erentiation may confound the e¤ect of switching cost on the intensity of competition, as pointed out by
Padilla (1995). More importantly, in the mixed strategy equilibrium I describe later, a rm makes all printer
sales only in the probabilistic sense. This is a common feature among models involving captive consumers
(Hal R. Varian 1980; Chakravarthi Narasimhan 1988; A. Jorge Padilla 1992, 1995).
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Within each period, rms make moves in the following order: the entrant moves rst by
announcing its choice of compatibility, that is, it decides whether to sell a printer system
compatible with the incumbents; then the two rms set prices simultaneously and consumers
make purchases.35 The game repeats itself every period afterwards.
To avoid the trivial open-set problem when the price space is a continuum, I assume
the following tie-breaking rules: (i) a printer buyer prefers the entrant; (ii) a printer owner
prefers cartridge over printer systems; and (iii) a rm prefers making positive sales to exit.
Although a printer owner can purchase either replacement cartridges or printer systems,
the following lemma allows us to signicantly narrow down the playersstrategy space.
Lemma 1 (No Arbitrage) 8t  1; pABi;t  pBi;t:36
The intuition behind this result is rather straightforward: a printer system and a cartridge
are perfect substitutes for a cartridge buyer, but the former costs more to produce. To prevent
cartridge buyers from buying a new printer system, a rm can always cut the cartridge price
while holding the system price constant. Lemma 1 also implies that the sale of cartridges to
existing customers establishes a price oor for the printer system, thus dampening a rms
incentive to cut system prices.
35It is without loss of generality to assume that each rm sells one printer system when all consumers are
myopic. If an entrant sells multiple systems, at most one will be sold in the equilibrium given my assumption
of identical new customers and high switching cost of old customers. If the incumbent sells multiple systems
with the same user interface, then again old and new customers will make the same choice due to zero
intrabrand switching cost; on the other hand, the cost (e.g., the xed cost of design) of introducing a system
with a new user interface (in order to raise the intrabrand switching cost) cannot justify the benet, which
is zero according to Shapiros argument (1995).
Later in the paper when foresighted consumers are included, rms will choose to sell multiple systems.
36If V A > 0 (see footnote 26), then pABi;t  pBi;t + V A.
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Let C = 1(compatible) 2 f0; 1g: The two rmsinstantaneous prot functions are
I [C; (pABI ; pBI ); (pABE ; pBE)] =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
pABI   cA   cB;
if pABI < p
AB
E and p
B
I > p
B
E and C = 1;
pABI   cA   cB + (pBI );
if pABI < p
AB
E and either (p
B
I )  pBE and C = 1) or (C = 0);
0;
if pABI  pABE and pBI > pBE and C = 1;
(pBI );
if pABI  pABE and either (pBI )  pBE and C = 1) or (C = 0):
E[C; (pABI ; pBI ); (pABE ; pBE)] =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(pBE);
if pABI < p
AB
E and p
B
I > p
B
E and C = 1;
0;
if pABI < p
AB
E and either (p
B
I  pBE and C = 1) or (C = 0);
pABE   cA   cB + (pBE);
if pABI  pABE and pBI > pBE and C = 1;
pABE   cA   cB;
if pABI  pABE and either (pBI  pBE and C = 1) or (C = 0):
Denote by WI(WE) the present value of the incumbent (entrant), FABI (F
AB
E ) the proba-
bility measure that represents the randomized pricing strategy in printer system to be played
when a rm is the incumbent (entrant) and FBI (F
B
E ) the corresponding measure for cartridge.
Starting from any initial condition, a mixed strategy prole fC; (FABI ; FBI ); (FABE ; FBE )g forms
a stationary MPE if
(3) WE = max
C2f0;1g
WE(C)
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(4) WI(C) = max
pABI ;p
B
I
fI [C; (pABI ; pBI ); (pABE ; pBE)] + WEFABE (pABI ) + WI [1  FABE (pABI )]g
(5) WE(C) = max
pABE ;p
B
E
fE[C; (pABI ; pBI ); (pABE ; pBE)] + WEFABI (pABE ) + WI [1  FABI (pABE )]g
and WI = WI(C); where C is a maximizing choice in (3), WI(C) and WE(C) are the incum-
bent and the entrants present values respectively, given the entrants compatibility choice
and given that rms play according to f(FABI ; FBI ); (FABE ; FBE )g:
C. The Main Result
In this section, I study duopoly rmsmarket behavior when all consumers are myopic
and derive the main result: aftermarket monopolization may exist in an equilibrium, where
competitive rms sell incompatible systems and earn abnormal prots.
Proposition 1 No pure strategy MPE, in which WE = 0 and C = 0; exists.
Proposition 2 A symmetric stationary MPE, in which both rms earn positive prots,
exists. Each period the entrant chooses incompatibility (C = 0), both the incumbent and the
entrant randomize their printer system price on the support of [p; pm], where p  cA   cB +
(1 + )(p) = (pm): The incumbent also sets pBI = p
AB
I .
37 The equilibrium is unique if the
equation for p has a unique solution.
If rms chose to produce compatible systems, then they would engage in Bertrand com-
petition in both printer and cartridge markets and earn zero prots. By choosing incom-
patibility, an entrant commits not to invade the incumbents installed base.38 This gives
the incumbent a monopoly in cartridges. In some sense, it "feeds" the cartridge buyers to
37However, a printer system will have a higher price than a cartridge if V A > 0 (see footnote 26).
38Carmen Matutes and Pierre Regibeau (1989) have also considered the choice of standardization when
there is competition between an incumbent and an entrant. They show that the "incumbent" chooses to
standardize its own products as a way of committing to uniform pricing, which softens competition. My
model complements theirs by considering the issue of standardization across manufacturers.
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the incumbent, who becomes a "fat cat" (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984) facing a trade-o¤
between attracting new printer buyers and harvesting old cartridge buyers. Compared to
the entrant, the incumbent has more to lose from a price war so it competes less aggressively.
This softens competition and allows both rms to earn higher prots.
While I have not tested the prediction that printer manufacturers use promotions to
compete for market share, a casual glance of the Sunday newspaper ads indicates that such
behavior is common.39 In the marketing literature, Lal (1990) provides several examples
which suggest that manufacturers tend to o¤er discounts at di¤erent times rather than at
the same time. More recently, using data from the printer market, Kutsal Dogan, Ernan
Haruvy and Ram C. Rao (2008) nd that market share is negatively correlated with the
frequency of promotional rebates. This result is worth noting because, in a static model of
consumer demand, one would expect the opposite, but it is consistent with the prediction of
this model.
It should also be noted that I obtain the no-standardization result even when allowing for
unilateral standardization. In the standardization literature involving network externalities
(Michael L. Katz and Shapiro, 1985), at least one rm (usually the entrant) prefers stan-
dardization. In the "mix and match" literature, Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992), and
Economides (1989) predict that system makers choose to produce compatible components,
because incompatibility is a commitment for aggressive pricing in the system market. In my
model, rms adopt incompatibility as a commitment to limited entry.
39The following quotes by the CEO of Lexmark is perhaps instructive:Although price promotion moves
have negatively impacted gross margins and revenue, our goal is to drive ... long-term supplies demand.
... [When] we talk about price, I think we have to di¤erentiate between tactical near-term and strategic
long-term. Long-term we do not want to be in a price war or in an aggressive price strategy (Empha-
sis and parentheses added). "Q3 2005 Lexmark International, Inc. Earnings Conference Call", Thomson
StreetEvents, 10/25/2005.
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D. Extensions
In this section, I consider three extensions of the model. First, I take into account consumer
and rm heterogeneity; second, I consider rmsincentives to educate myopic consumers;
third, I examine the market outcome of a standardization requirement.
a. Some Consumers Are Myopic
Many economists hold the view that the existence of a small fraction of nonrational agents
does not a¤ect market e¢ ciency, because any "noise" generated by these agents is eliminated
by market forces. Shapiro (1995) applies this view to refute the aftermarket monopolization
hypothesis:
It is not necessary for all consumers to have good information in order for
aftermarket prices to be disciplined by equipment competition. Poorly informed
buyers may be protected by informed buyers, whose presence forces sellers to
compete on a TCO basis and penalizes sellers with high aftermarket charges,
especially since it may be di¢ cult for sellers to identify the poorly informed
buyers so as to price discriminate against them.
My analysis below shows that Shapiros intuition does not apply in my model, because
myopic consumers do not make the same choice as foresighted consumers.40 In fact, a
rm can perfectly "identify" myopic consumers using the standard self-selection mechanism:
foresighted consumers choose a printer with lower cartridge costs whereas myopic consumers,
without taking into account cartridge costs, opt for a cheaper printer.
I consider the same game as the one in the basic model, but each period a fraction of
new customers are foresighted. In the pricing game involving myopic consumers, it does
not matter whether a rm changes its cartridge price after a printer system is bought,
because a myopic consumer does not condition her system purchase decision on the cartridge
40Thus my result di¤ers from Gabaix and Laibson (2006), which predicts that consumers of di¤erent types
choose the same primary good.
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price. But for foresighted consumers, it matters. To focus on the impact of consumer
myopia and rule out aftermarket over-pricing due to "inability to commit" (Borenstein et
al., 1995, 2000), I assume that rms can keep their promises on aftermarket prices, i.e., there
is no "surprise" price increase in period 2. There are two justications for this assumption:
rst, there are many forms of commitment technology available, either through contracts
(e.g., a price protection clause) or through advertising;41 second, hardware supplies can be
stored; anticipating its inability to commit, a rm can simply o¤er a quantity discount to
(foresighted) consumers who choose to buy and store supplies for their second-period usage.
With the addition of foresighted consumers, rms may choose to sell multiple printers
and cartridges in order to price discriminate.42 I assume that printer systems and cartridges
from the same rm have the same technology, but may be priced di¤erently. They may
also be incompatible with each other, meaning that two printer systems do not use the
same cartridge. Hence, each period there are up to four printer systems and four cartridges
available,
 
pABi ; p
B
i

; i = 1; 2; :::; 4:
I also consider rms that di¤er in costs. Without loss of generality, I assume that rm 1
is a (weakly) more e¢ cient printer producer, i.e., cA1  cA2 : Since there are only two types of
consumers, For ease of exposition, I further assume that
Assumption 3 (Loss Leader) cA2 + c
B > vAB.43 This condition implies that the less e¢ -
cient rm cannot make money from only selling printer systems.
One might expect that rm 1, being more e¢ cient, can exclude rm 2 from the market.
This is indeed true in the market segment for foresighted consumers, but not for myopic
41According to Shapiro (1995), "A manufacturer can promise for some period of time not to change certain
of its policies, such as its policy to sell replacement parts to ISOs on the same terms as they are sold to
nal customers. Or a manufacturer can promise to support open systems or second sources for service or
software upgrades. Protections like these are sought by some customers and o¤ered by some sellers in the
real world."
42Since rms can successfully use second-degree price discrimination, third-degree price discrimination is
unnecessary and therefore ruled out in the model.
43It is easy to see that, if cA2 + c
B  vAB ; then an equilibrium exists where min(cA2 + cB ; pm) becomes the
upper support of the randomized prices for printer systems sold to myopic consumers.
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consumers. My method of solution is constructive. I rst solve for the equilibrium prices of
printer systems and cartridges sold to foresighted consumers and then compare them with
those sold to myopic consumers to verify incentive compatibility.
Lemma 2 If all consumers are foresighted, then only rm 1 (the more e¢ cient rm) is
active. It sells a printer system for cA2 + c
B and a cartridge for cB.
Comparing Proposition 2 and Lemma 2, we can see that the availability of other printer
systems changes neither type of consumerschoice. Therefore, I conclude,
Proposition 3 The market is segregated. (i) Firm 1 sells to foresighted consumers with a
printer system and a cartridge priced at (cA2 + c
B; cB); (ii) The two rms compete for myopic
consumers in the same way as described by Proposition 2 (with cA being replaced by cA1 ); (iii)
a printer system sold to myopic consumers is incompatible with any other systems.
Standard Bertrand competition is e¢ cient in the sense that only the most e¢ cient rm
can survive the competition. This e¢ ciency property fails to hold when rms compete for
myopic consumers. For foresighted consumers, a rm can compete by cutting either the
system price or the cartridge price. Its price constraint is binding at its rivals cost, so a
more e¢ cient rm can exclude the rival and earn a prot equal to its cost advantage. For
myopic consumers, cutting the cartridge price is useless. A rm can only compete by cutting
the system price, which is nonetheless bounded below by the cartridge price, and this shifts
up the binding price constraint. Neither rm has an advantage over the other and the two
have to share the market.
As a result, aftermarket monopolization persists (in the market segment of myopic con-
sumers) even if the fraction of myopic consumers is small. Firms use loss leader pricing to
attract myopic consumers and use system incompatibility to prevent them from buying cheap
cartridges. Intense competition for foresighted consumers has no e¤ect on the cartridge price
paid by myopic consumers.
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Corollary 1 The less e¢ cient rm has a smaller market share (in terms of total sales over
time) and derives all of its prot from the aftermarket.
Unable to compete for foresighted consumers, the less e¢ cient rm targets myopic con-
sumers and obtains a small but positive market share. This means that even a rm without
market power in the primary market may still have the incentive and ability to monopolize
aftermarket.44 This prediction is not inconsistent with the fact that Kodak, a small player
in the photocopier industry, has been accused of monopolizing its service market.45
b. No-Debiasing
Paradoxically, being the only seller for foresighted consumers does not always bring greater
rewards to the more e¢ cient rm, who actually enjoys a higher (per customer) prot in
the seemingly more competitive market for myopic consumers. Rather than capture all
consumers via education, the rm may choose to share the market (when the cost di¤erence
is not too big) and take advantage of myopic consumers.
Now I consider competing rmsincentive to educate myopic consumers.46 As in Gabaix
and Laibson (2006), I assume that a rm can costlessly inform myopic consumers so that
all (the current generation) consumers become foresighted. Firms make choices of education
before competing in prices.
Proposition 4 If 1+2
1+
(cA2   cA1 )  [(pm)  (p)], where p is such that p  cA1   cB + (1 +
)(p) = (pm); then no rm educates consumers in any period.
44Blackstone (1975) documents high aftermarket prices and related antitrust lawsuits involving the SCM
corporation, a rm with very limited market power in the copy machine industry.
45Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that other factors may have led to Kodaks alleged practice
of refusal to deal. As argued by Shapiro (1995), Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2006) and
demonstrated in my monopoly model, Kodak, already a monopoly in its component supply, should have no
incentive to monopolize the service market through refusal to deal, since it can adopt the "price squeeze"
strategy to capture its rent if so desired or simply raise the component price to an exorbitantly high level to
deny other service suppliers. Also, in the market for high-volume copiers, in which Kodak competes, buyers
are mostly big businesses, so my assumption of anonymous buyers may not readily apply.
46Learning through experience, however, is not modeled in this paper.
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In the traditional literature of pricing games, best responses in prices are always local
deviations. A collusive outcome cannot be supported in a Nash equilibrium because the
incentive to undercut is too strong. In my model, the "nonlocal" property of education
forces rms to compare the payo¤ of a global deviation to the collusive outcome: to increase
its prot, a rm may want to steal business from its competitor by educating a myopic
consumer and o¤ering a lower cartridge price, but such an attempt is self-defeating because
it changes the consumers type and e¤ectively turns away the consumer. Therefore, rms
may have no incentive to educate even if doing so is costless.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) also consider rms incentive to educate naive consumers.
They nd that whether rms choose to educate consumers depends on the ratio between the
aftermarket prot and the social welfare distortion due to price deviations from marginal
cost; education (unshrouding in their terminology) arises if and only if the ratio is smaller
than 1. Since they consider only the case of equally e¢ cient rms, in order to facilitate
comparison, I use the following result.
Corollary 2 If rms are equally e¢ cient, then no rm educates consumers in any period.
To understand the di¤erence between their result and mine, it is useful to contrast the
equilibrium outcomes of the two models. Their model generates a pooling equilibrium, in
which both naive and sophisticated consumers buy the same product, but the former con-
sume more than the optimal amount. Firms earn zero prots because of competition. Prots
earned from naive consumers end up being subsidies to sophisticated consumers. An "edu-
cated" consumer would rather receive the cross-subsidy and therefore switches supplier only
if the subsidy is small, in which case education may be protable. My model, however,
generates a separating equilibrium, in which myopic and foresighted consumers buy di¤erent
products. Firms earn positive prots from myopic consumers, but zero prots from fore-
sighted ones. An "educated" consumer always switches; but instead of switching to the rm
who educates so that the rm can increase its prot, the consumer switches to products
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o¤ered at marginal costs and therefore education is never protable between two symmetric
rms.
The above comparison also suggests that the no-education outcome may be more per-
vasive than predicted by Gabaix and Laibson. In their model, if the social welfare loss due
to aftermarket over-pricing is so large that it exceeds the aftermarket prot, then rms will
choose to educate consumers and restore the e¢ cient outcome; so the welfare loss predicted
by their model is, to some degree, muted by rmsincentive to educate. That is not the case
in my model, in which rms will hold onto the aftermarket prot regardless how small it is
and a rm will choose to educate consumers only when its cost advantage is so big that it is
no longer willing to share the market.
c. Standardization Requirement
Although aftermarket monopolization due to consumer myopia is potentially harmful, reme-
dies such as a standardization requirement that aim to reinforce aftermarket competition
have to be prescribed with caution.47 Under realistic parameter values, myopic consumers
may su¤er even more if cartridges are standardized, as shown in the following:
Proposition 5 If (equally e¢ cient) rms48 are required to sell a standardized cartridge,
then both rms sell the printer system at cA + cB and the cartridge at cB. If cA + cB > vAB;
then no myopic consumer makes purchases.
Proof. Obvious.
Standardization reduces or even eliminates rmscartridge prots. If printers are sold
at a loss, then the loss of cartridge prots may lead rms to completely abandon myopic
consumers, leaving both sides worse o¤. Therefore, the correct policy response necessarily
47Although standard requirements have rarely been used in the past, it does become an issue in a recent
antitrust case involving compatibility between a Windows client PC and a work group server (E.U. v.
Microsoft, 2006). Microsoft has been ordered by the European Commission to disclose interoperability
information to other server producers for the development of compatible products.
48If rms di¤er in costs, then whether to cover myopic consumers also depends on their population size.
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depends on the empirical estimates of model parameters. This result also shows that granted
consumer bias exists, there is no strong case for government intervention, once the logic is
allowed to run its full course.
III. Primary Market Monopoly
To complete the analysis, I also consider the case of primary market monopoly. The purpose
of carrying out this analysis is twofold: on one hand, it allows me to compare the perfor-
mances of myopic decision making under di¤erent market structures, and I show myopic
decision making may serve as a useful heuristic for consumers who trade with a monopolist;
on the other hand, I argue that consumer myopia does not necessarily entail aftermarket
monopolization. I nd that a monopolists prot decreases with the percentage of myopic
consumers, hence it has a strong incentive to educate myopic consumers and commit to
marginal cost pricing in the aftermarket.
To gain some intuition for the results, the following observation is useful.
Observation 1 A myopic consumer obtains a nonnegative surplus each period. Moreover,
she obtains a positive surplus in the second-period for any positive amount of consumption.
This observation is important for us to understand why consumer myopia may be a mixed
blessing for rms. While it allows rms to raise aftermarket prices, it makes consumers tough
bargainers in their initial purchases: they refuse to pay for anything beyond the immediate
benets. In a di¤erent context, Shlomo Benartzi and Richard H. Thaler (1995) show that a
myopic investor demands a higher risk premium. This is consistent with my observation.
Proposition 6 (i) A monopolists prot decreases with , the proportion of myopic con-
sumers; (ii) A monopolist earns a higher prot from a foresighted consumer than from a
myopic consumer; (iii) A monopolist obtains the maximal social surplus when  = 0.
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The monopolist faces a standard problem of designing two two-part tari¤s for consumers
with di¤erent willingnesses to pay. Foresighted consumers have higher willingness to pay thus
receiving a lower price and buying more cartridges. This enables the monopolist to extract
more consumer surplus. In fact, when all consumers are foresighted, a monopolist can capture
its full rent by pricing the cartridges at cost and raising the system price (Bowman, 1957).
The presence of myopic consumers constrains a monopolists ability to capture its full rent in
three ways: (1) suboptimal consumption of a myopic consumer reduces total surplus; (2) the
downward sloping demand for cartridges leaves a myopic consumer with a positive residual
surplus; (3) the option to mimic a myopic consumer guarantees a foresighted consumer a
positive surplus. Therefore a monopolist has a strong incentive to educate myopic consumers.
Next, I consider two extreme cases in which all consumers are either foresighted or myopic.
We can think of them as situations under which an individual buyer bargains with a seller,
who makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
Corollary 3 When  = 1; each myopic consumer obtains a positive surplus; when  = 0;
each foresighted consumer obtains zero surplus.
Simply being myopic does not make a consumer necessarily worse o¤: when bargaining
with a monopolist, a myopic consumers focus on immediate payo¤ allows her to obtain a
higher surplus than she otherwise might get by being foresighted. This result suggests that
the myopic approach might be a useful heuristic for an inexperienced buyer, even though its
generalization into a competitive setting turns out to be harmful, as shown earlier.
It should be noted, however, that the above results are directly linked to the special
features of the demand functions assumed in the model, namely, a unit demand for the
primary product and a downward-sloping demand for the aftermarket product.49 The results
in Proposition 6 and Corollary 3 would disappear if I assumed unit demands for both the
primary product and the aftermarket product. In other words, if we take the simple case
discussed in the introduction, a monopolist of the primary product should be able to make
49I am grateful to an anonymous referee who made this point together with a detailed discussion.
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the same prot from the myopic consumers as from the foresighted consumers. Similarly, if
demand curves for the primary product and aftermarket product are both downward-sloping,
both types of consumers would obtain positive surpluses.
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I show that the standard Bertrand competition argument may not apply when
rms compete for myopic consumers. I develop the model in the context of aftermarket.
I nd that primary market competition does not dissipate aftermarket rents, because of
the arbitrage constraint in aftermarket pricing. While my result suggests that aftermarket
monopolization is harmful to consumers, the policy implication is less than clear-cut. The
right policy prescription is highly sensitive to the parameter values of the model, as shown in
Proposition 5. A policy aiming to curb market power, such as a standardization requirement,
may lead primary good producers to abandon myopic consumer altogether.50
The model developed in this paper may also help us think about the issue of planned
obsolescence under intense price competition. Existing literature shows that a durable goods
monopolist has an excessive incentive to introduce new products that make old units ob-
solete.51 My result suggests that competing sellers may also have an incentive to practice
planned obsolescence, because their prots from selling upgrades are not competed away by
low prices in the system market. Essentially, rms create their aftermarket, the market of
upgrades. For example,52 Intuit retires old versions of Quicken, a personal nance manage-
ment software, by disabling the online components of those programs so that users have to
buy the upgrades every other year. Intuit calls this phase-out of older software its "sunset
50This is a familiar theme in the antitrust literature: any policies designed to mitigate a rms pricing
power also reduce its incentive to invest.
51Important contributions to this literature include, but are not limited to, Waldman (1993, 1996), Choi
(1994) and Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
52The antivirus software market mentioned earlier in the paper is another example.
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policy."53 Microsoft Money, the products main competitor, also comes with only two years
of online services included with purchase.54
A remaining question is why consumers act myopically. In my model, the myopic ap-
proach has no adverse e¤ect when a buyer deals with a single seller, but leads to signicant
detriment for a buyer choosing between competing sellers. While it is beyond the scope of this
paper, I speculate that focusing on the immediate payo¤ may serve as a useful heuristic in
some situations involving complex decision making, but that individuals may over-generalize
the heuristic to other situations when it is not optimal. The tendency of an individual to
over-generalize a useful heuristic is a recurring theme in the psychology literature but has
not yet been systematically studied by economists. Using analytical tools to compare perfor-
mances of a certain heuristic in di¤erent economic environments can be the rst step towards
bridging the gap.
In order to compare my result with that of Bertrand competition in the easiest way, I
have made a number of simplifying assumptions: rst, rms are assumed to sell ex ante
homogeneous products; second, I assume a duopoly with no potential entry; third, I choose
to focus on primary market competition and ignore possible aftermarket competition from
third-party suppliers.55 Future studies that incorporate more realistic elements can help us
better understand the issues discussed in this paper.
53The "sunset policy" can also be viewed as a lease-only policy. According to Waldman (1996, 1997) and
Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), rms employ the lease-only policy to eliminate old units from the market in order
to charge more for new units. However, this explanation is applicable to hardware with a secondhand market
but less so to software, of which a secondhand market is prohibited due to copyright concerns (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1998).
54"Sunset PolicyStymies Loyal Quicken Users," Mike Musgrove, Washington Post, 02/06/2005.
55Firms have a powerful incentive to foreclose competition in the aftermarket (Michael D. Whinston, 1990).
For example, printer manufacturers have developed "smart chips" that can practically disable the printer if
third-party cartridge are detected ("Consumer IT goods and services", the O¢ ce of Fair Trading, 2002).
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose pABI < p
B
I ; then a cartridge buyer buys a new system. The in-
cumbents instantaneous prot is (pBI ) = (p
AB
I  cA cB)D(pABI ) from such a customer. But
if the rm lowers the cartridge price to pABI (This does not a¤ect a new customers purchase
decision hence the rms evolving market share and future prots), then its instantaneous
prot from the cartridge buyer increases to (pABI  cB)D(pABI ) > (pBI ): Contradiction. Last,
we note that the strategy of not selling cartridges can be seen as setting an innitely high
price for the cartridge, but this strategy is weakly dominated by selling cartridges for the
same price as printer systems.
Proof of Proposition 1. In a pure strategy equilibrium, if C = 0; then we must have
WI  (pm)+WE, since the incumbent can always set pBI = pm and abandon printer buyers.
Suppose that in the equilibrium pABI < p
m; then we have pABI   cA   cB + (pBI ) + WI 
(pm) + WE; where pBI  pABI . Since the entrant can always set pABE = pABI to attract all
printer buyers, we must haveWE  pABI  cA cB+WI : HenceWE  (pm) (pBI )+WE 
(pm) (pABI )+ WE > 0: Now suppose that pABI  pm; thenWE  pABI   cA  cB+ WI 
pABI   cA   cB + (m + WE): Solving, we get WE  (1   2)(pm   cA   cB + m) > 0;
(Assumption 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. If the entrant chooses incompatibility, then only the incumbent
sells cartridges. Since pABI  pBI ; we must have pBI = min(pABI ; pm): Hence, we only need
to solve for FABI and F
AB
E : For notational simplicity, I suppress superscript "AB" in the
proof. Since printer systems from the two rms are ex ante homogeneous, the equilibrium
distributions of their prices have the same support. (This is true even if rms are not equally
e¢ cient, as is the case discussed later.) Denote it by [p; p]: My proof proceeds in four steps:
First, I show that FI(pAB) and FE(pAB) are atomless in the interior of [p; p]: Suppose that
the incumbent names the printer system price at p 2 (p; p) with some positive probability
q; then the entrant cannot be indi¤erent between p and p+ " : when the entrant changes its
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price from p+" to p; it increases its probability of winning all new customers by q but lowers
its average price in the order of ": Therefore, it must strictly prefer p over p+ ": This means
that p+" cannot be on the support of [p; p]; for a player must be indi¤erent among the prices
which it mixes over given its opponents price distribution. In other words, p cannot belong
to the interior of [p; p]: By similar reasoning, one can show that FE(pAB) is also atomless in
the interior of [p; p]:
Second, I show that p = pm: Substituting pBI = min(p
AB
I ; p
m) into Eq. (4), we get
(A1)
WI(C = 0) = (pABI  cA cB)[1 FE(pABI )]+(min[pABI ; pm])+fWI [1 FE(pABI )]+WEFE(pABI )g
By denition, FE(p) = 1: Thus we have WI(p) = (pm) + WE if p  pm and WI(p) =
(p) + WE if p < pm: Therefore, WI(p) is increasing in p when p < pm but a constant
when pm  p  vAB: Suppose that p takes a value between pm and vAB; then the two rms
equilibrium pricing strategy can be characterized by the following rst-order conditions:
(A2) [1  FI(pABE )]  [pABE   cA   cB + (p)]F 0I(pABE ) = 0
(A3)
[1 + 0(pAB)  FE(pABI )]  [pABI   cA   cB + (p)]F 0E(pABI ) = 0;
[1  FE(pABI )]  [pABI   cA   cB + (p)]F 0E(pABI ) = 0;
when p  pAB  pm
when pm < pAB  p
In the range between pm and p; we have FE(pABI ) = 1   KpABI  cA cB+(p) and FE(p) = 1;
hence K = 0: It follows that FE(pm) = 1: Therefore, p = pm: Solving, we get FI(pABE ) = 1 
p cA cB+(p)
pABE  cA cB+(p)
for pAB 2 [p; pm) with FI(pm) = 1; and FE(pABI ) = 1+0(x) e x
x(pm)Z
x(pABI )
ez00dz;
where x(pAB) = ln[pAB   cA   cB + (p)]:
Third, I solve for p: Since FE(p) = 1; we have WI = (pm) + WE: At the same time;
FE(p) = 0 and FI(p) = 0: Therefore, WE = p   cA   cB + WI and WI = p   cA   cB +
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(p) + WI :
56 Thus we have WE(C = 0) =
(pm) (p)
1  and WI(C = 0) =
(pm) (p)
1  ; where p
is such that p   cA   cB + (1 + )(p) = (pm): Since the LHS increases in p; equals  cA
when p = cB; and equals pm  cA  cB+(1+ )(pm) > (pm) (Assumption 1) when p = pm;
we must have cB < p < pm: By the assumption that  is single-peaked, we know that the
present values of both rms are positive: If the equation for p has a unique solution, then
[p; p] completely determines the support of equilibrium strategies so the equilibrium we have
constructed is also the unique equilibrium when C = 0.
Last, if the entrant chooses compatibility, then the two rms also compete in the car-
tridge market. Competition for cartridge buyers is a standard one-shot Bertrand competi-
tion. Therefore, pBI = p
B
E = c
B. (Since the monopoly prots are bounded, allowing mixed
strategies does not lead to positive prots equilibria.) Due to zero aftermarket prot, com-
petition in the printer market becomes a standard Bertrand competition with an innite
horizon. Since punishment strategies are ruled out, the only subgame-perfect strategies in-
volve marginal cost pricing. ThusWE(C = 1) = 0. Therefore, C = 0 is the optimizing choice
for the entrant.
Proof of Lemma 2. If pB 6= cB, then a rm can set a new price schedule (pAB + [V (cB) 
V (pB)]; cB); which gives foresights consumers the same surplus but increases the rms prot
by [V (cB)   V (pB)   (pB)] > 0; by R2. Contradiction. The arbitrage constraint has no
bite, since pAB + [V (cB)  V (pB)]  cA + cB   (pB) + [V (cB)  V (pB)]  cA + cB > cB:
Due to zero aftermarket prot, competition in the printer market is a standard Bertrand
competition with an innite horizon. Since punishment strategies are ruled out, printer
systems are priced at the less e¢ cient rms marginal cost.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) The printer system (cA2 +c
B; cB) gives all foresighted consumers
the maximal surplus, but it attracts neither old myopic consumers nor new myopic consumers
because cA2 + c
B > vAB > pm; (iii) must hold, otherwise an old myopic consumer can buy
56Without the arbitrage constraint, we would have WI = p  cA   cB + (pm) + WI and thus WE = 0:
29
cheap cartridges sold to foresighted consumers. In addition, by Proposition 2 the two printer
systems sold to myopic consumers are incompatible.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is obvious that rm 1, when it is the incumbent, benets most
from educating myopic consumers. So I only consider its incentive to educate.
The present values of the two rms are determined by the following set of equations:
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
W1I = (p
m) + W1E;
W1I = p  cA1   cB + (p) + W1I ;
W1E = p  cA1   cB + W1I ;
W2I = (p
m) + W2E;
W2E = p  cA2   cB + W2I ;
Solving, we get W1I =
(pm) (p)
1 2 ;W1E =
(pm) (p)
1  ; W2I = W1I   1 2c; and W2E =
W1E   11 2c; where c = cA2   cA1 and p is such that p  cA1   cB + (1 + )(p) = (pm):
Now suppose that rm 1 chooses to educate myopic consumers, then they will buy the
printer system sold to foresighted consumers. In addition, rm 1 can freely charge a monopoly
price to its cartridge buyers. This gives it an instantaneous payo¤ of (pm) + c. In the
next period, it can use its cost advantage to keep rm 2 out of the market and gain all
myopic consumers. To nd the price that allows rm 1 to exclude rm 2, we need to nd
the value of a captive consumer to rm 2. Since rm 2 gets W2E if it loses this periods
printer buyers but gets p   cA2   cB + W2I if it wins, it is willing to price its printer
system as low as p = cA2 + c
B   (W2I   W2E): Thus rm 1s net payo¤ from (1-period)
education is (pm) +c+ [c  (W2I  W2E)] + (2   1)W1I : This is positive if and only
if (1+2
1+
)c > [(pm)  (p)]:
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) According to Observation 1, any printer system bought by
a myopic consumer generates a positive discounted sum of surplus. Hence a foresighted
consumer will always make purchases in the equilibrium, but there are two possible cases:
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(a) only foresighted consumers are covered. A monopolist can use the printer system
price to extract full surplus hence cartridges are priced at cost. The monopolists prot is
1 = (1  )[vAB + V (cB)  cA   cB], decreasing in :
(b) foresighted consumers buy printer system 1 and myopic consumers buy printer system
2. As in (a), we know pB1 = c
B: Since a foresighted consumer can mimic a myopic consumer,
her IC constraint is binding. Hence, pAB1 = v
AB + [V (cB)   V (pB2 )]: At the same time,
a myopic consumers IR constraint is binding, pAB2 = v
AB: Since pAB2 < p
AB
1 ; a myopic
consumers IC constraint is satised. Thus the monopolists prot can be written as 2 =
maxpB2 fvAB   cA  cB + [V (cB)  V (pB2 )] + [(pB2 ) + V (pB2 )  V (cB)]g: It is decreasing in
, by the envelop theorem and R2.
Since the monopolists prot is  = maxf1; 2g; it must be decreasing in  too.
(ii) This follows from (i) in both cases.
(iii) If  = 0; then  = vAB + V (cB)  cA   cB; the maximal social surplus.
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